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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 n February 4, 2013 the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) 
published a leaked U.S. Department of Justice White Paper outlining the 
U.S. government’s legal authority to kill American citizens who occupy sen-
ior operational roles within Al Qaeda.1 In addition to raising domestic con-
stitutional questions, the White Paper cast renewed attention upon a num-
ber of contentious international law issues. These concerns, which all stem 
from a lack of clarity as to when a State may conduct hostilities against 
armed groups located outside its borders, include the extent of a State’s 
                                                                                                                      
* Visiting Research Scholar at the Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island; PhD 
candidate, Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, University of Melbourne Law School. For 
helpful comments and conversations, special thanks to Jann Kleffner, Michael Schmitt, 
Kinga Tibori-Szabó, Michelle Lesh, Lieutenant Commander James Farrant, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Marko Divac Oberg and Captain Ralph Thomas (Ret.).  
1. U.S. Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Cit-
izen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or an Associated Force (2011), available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf 
[hereinafter DOJ White Paper].  
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right of self-defense against the actions of an armed group in a second 
State; the question of when the law of armed conflict (LOAC) is triggered; 
and the body of law that applies to individuals affiliated with an armed 
group, yet who are located in a second State at a distance from the main 
area of hostilities. As part of that broader discussion, this article focuses on 
the question of when hostilities with armed groups operating across State 
borders may be classified as an armed conflict, and therefore subject to 
LOAC. The latter issue of what law is applicable to individuals located 
away from the battlefield once an armed conflict exists is also briefly ad-
dressed. 
This topic has particular relevance today given the frequency with 
which armed groups disregard State boundaries in conducting their opera-
tions and the ambiguity surrounding the applicable legal framework. The 
law of armed conflict is structured around State-centric concepts of sover-
eignty and territory, and is designed for either inter-State conflicts or for 
purely internal armed conflicts.2 Its contours have been based on territorial 
boundaries.3 Thus, international armed conflicts (IACs)4 may generally only 
occur between States.5 Non-international armed conflicts (NIACs),6 or 
                                                                                                                      
2. For an interesting historical discussion of the territorialized thinking influence upon 
the development of LOAC, see Louise Arimatsu, Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 12 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 157 (2009).  
3. Id. at 170. 
4. The main treaties applicable to international armed conflicts are: Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC 
III]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].   
5. See COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT 
OF PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY] 
(“Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of 
the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2.”); Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter 
Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction]. Recognized belligerencies and the controversial 
Article 1(4) of AP I are exceptions. 
6. The law applicable to NIACs is found in Article 3 Common to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 (Common Article 3) and in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
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conflicts where armed groups either fight a State or each other, have tradi-
tionally been geographically limited to the confines of a State.7  
Conflicts such as the Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006, the ongoing con-
flict in Afghanistan that has spilled over into Pakistan and the U.S. global 
armed conflict against Al Qaeda8 challenge this traditional State-centric 
structure of LOAC. As a result, there is considerable debate as to how such 
extraterritorial hostilities (i.e., those that cross State borders) should be 
characterized. If hostilities do not rise to the level of an armed conflict, 
they fall under a law enforcement regime9 and are governed mainly by do-
mestic law and international human rights law. Although extraterritorial 
hostilities do not fit neatly into any of these three existing legal divisions—
IACs, NIACs or law enforcement—their categorization has serious practi-
cal implications. Particularly, the classification of conflict affects such mat-
ters as how force may be used, what rules apply for detention and whether 
an individual may be held criminally liable.10  
                                                                                                                      
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. In addition, rele-
vant customary international law applies to non-international armed conflicts. Domestic 
law and international human rights law continue to apply in situations of armed conflict. 
See, e.g., A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 217 (3d ed. 2012). The interaction of 
human rights law, domestic law and LOAC during an armed conflict is a complex matter 
that is beyond the scope of this paper. In armed conflict LOAC is the lex specialis.   
7. See infra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text. 
8. The United States considers that it is engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda 
and its associates that spreads across multiple territories. See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra 
note 1, at 3. This is not to suggest that the whole world is the battlefield for this type of 
conflict, but that the conflict spans multiple States. See, e.g., the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine 
Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations ¶ 5.1.2.3 (2007), available at 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-0defea93325c/1-14M 
(“The Global War on Terror is an example of this new type of conflict . . . .  What law 
applies in this type of conflict is still being settled.”). 
9. The terms law enforcement situation and peacetime are not used in this article to 
mean a total lack of hostilities, but merely to describe situations that do not rise to the 
level of armed conflicts.    
10. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 618 (Dieter Fleck 
ed., 2d ed. 2010). Therefore, if hostilities qualify as an armed conflict, targeting an individ-
ual participating in the conflict is likely to be lawful (if, of course, it is done in accordance 
with the applicable rules). In contrast, if considered a law enforcement scenario, the use of 
force against an individual would be lawful in a more limited set of circumstances. In addi-
tion, substantial differences in the content of certain IAC and NIAC rules exist. For ex-
ample, combatant status and prisoner of war status only pertain to IACs.  
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Several approaches have been put forth for how to legally categorize 
extraterritorial hostilities with armed groups. In Part II, this article provides 
a contextual framework for the discussion by laying out these various ap-
proaches. Part III outlines the law applicable to NIACs. Part IV discusses 
why the prevailing view is that some of these extraterritorial conflicts may 
qualify as NIACs despite the fact that such conflicts do not conform to the 
traditional interpretations limiting the application of LOAC to within a 
State’s own borders.11 
Part V examines potential problems in applying a body of law that was 
intended for internal application to an extraterritorial context. The fact that 
the law was not designed for such use has led to inconsistencies in the ra-
tionale for when and where this body of law applies. Today, many argue 
that NIAC law may apply to spill-over conflicts and even to hostilities that 
occur between a State and an armed group predominantly in the territory 
of a second uninvolved State (e.g., the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict). In con-
trast, a great deal of unease surrounds the notion that a global armed con-
flict is taking place with Al Qaeda. There is concern that the removal of 
territorial restrictions when establishing the existence of an armed conflict 
could transform the entire world into a potential “battlefield.”12  
An examination of the requirements for the existence of an armed con-
flict and their underlying purpose suggest that the criteria for establishing 
when a NIAC exists cannot be entirely divorced from geography. In par-
ticular, difficulties may arise in establishing that an armed conflict exists 
when hostilities with armed groups span multiple States. One challenge is 
                                                                                                                      
11. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 37; Roy S. Schondorf, Extra-State Armed 
Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1, 50 (2004); ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 49–
51 (2010); Arimatsu, supra note 2, at 186. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 
THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 15.2 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANU-
AL]. 
12. See, e.g., Letter from Human Rights Watch to President Barack Obama Re: Target-
ed Killings and Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Drones) (Dec. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/07/letter-obama-targeted-killings (“While the Unit-
ed States is a party to armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and could become a party to 
armed conflicts elsewhere, the notion that the entire world is automatically by extension a 
battleground in which the laws of war are applicable is contrary to international law.”). See 
also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Study on Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 67, 68, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr 
.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf 
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how the law factors in the links between various armed groups when calcu-
lating whether the violence has reached a sufficient level of intensity neces-
sary to trigger LOAC. This involves a combination of distinguishing the 
identifiable party and establishing the intensity requirement. Another issue 
is whether violence diffused over a number of countries can be amassed in 
order to reach a total level of intensity. In addition, a shift in the State 
whose sovereignty is affected could have an impact on the underlying pur-
pose of the intensity criterion. 
Part VI briefly considers the separate issue of where LOAC may be ap-
plied once the law of armed conflict has been triggered. The question is 
contentious and at this point unresolved. The article suggests that the most 
defensible position is that once an armed conflict exists, the law applies to 
the parties to the conflict even if in another country, but that a number of 
other factors restrict whether or not an individual may be targeted or de-
tained. Under this view, the key question is whether an armed conflict ex-
ists in the first place. The majority of the article concentrates on this for-
mer question. 
Part VII concludes that although the law applicable to NIACs may ap-
ply extraterritorially, the process of establishing when an armed conflict 
exists is still partially bound geographically by virtue of the intensity re-
quirement. In this sense, the law does not simply follow the parties to the 
conflict. Because the law was designed with territorial constraints in mind, 
there is a need for clarification of when the law is to apply extraterritorially.  
Before addressing the main issues of this article, two preliminary mat-
ters should be highlighted. First, a factual distinction is made between three 
types of hostilities, all of which fall under the category of “extraterritorial”: 
(1) conflicts within a single State that spill over into neighboring States; (2) 
conflicts that take place between a State and an armed group located in a 
second uninvolved State; and (3) conflicts between a State and an armed 
group that spread across multiple States. Scholars frequently use the term 
“transnational armed conflicts” to describe the latter two situations,13 and 
                                                                                                                      
13. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn & Eric T. Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A ‘Principled’ 
Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 46 
(2009), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1256380 [herein-
after Corn & Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict]; Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the 
Regulation of Hostilities—The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDER-
BILT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (2007) [hereinafter Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, 
and the Regulation of Hostilities]. Other terms used include “extra-state hostilities,” Schon-
dorf, supra note 11, and “extra-territorial NIAC,” Arimatsu, supra note 2, at 183. 
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at times all three.14 This article employs the terms “spill-over,” “cross-
border” and “global” armed conflicts, respectively, in order to differentiate 
between the three types of conflicts.15 
Second, determining if and when force may be used in self-defense is a 
different issue than establishing whether that use of force amounts to an 
armed conflict. The former is a jus ad bellum issue and the latter a matter of 
jus in bello. Jus ad bellum determines, inter alia, under what circumstances a 
State may use force in self-defense.16 Jus in bello is another name for the 
body of law applicable to armed conflict. While both are often discussed 
within the context of extraterritorial hostilities with armed groups and at 
times conflated,17 they are distinct bodies of law. Once a State employs 
force in self-defense, the question still remains as to what body of law gov-
erns that use of force. If the situation rises to the level of an armed conflict, 
LOAC applies.18 Alternatively, the situation is governed by a law enforce-
                                                                                                                      
14. See generally Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing 
Transnational Armed Conflict, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245 (2010). 
15. It must be emphasized that these terms refer to factual, not legal, categories of 
conflict. For a more extensive typology of non-international armed conflicts, see INTER-
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 9–12 (2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-
conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf [hereinafter 31st 
ICRC Conference on IHL CHALLENGES].    
16. Jus ad bellum governs the legality of resort to the use of force by a State. The ex-
ceptions to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the resort to force are individual and collec-
tive self-defense, and when authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII (such as 
occurred in the military intervention in Libya in 2011).  
17. A number of statements by U.S. government officials, for instance, leave it un-
clear whether the legal justification for using force against Al Qaeda and its associates is 
that of self-defense, a global armed conflict or both. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address at Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“as a matter of international 
law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent 
with its inherent right to self-defense under international law”). See also Attorney General 
Eric Holder’s response to Senator Lindsey Graham. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 33 (2011) (“The operation against 
bin Laden was justified as an act of national self defense. It is lawful to target an enemy 
commander in the field. We did so, for instance, with regard to Yamamoto in World War 
II when he was shot down in an airplane.”). 
18. It should be noted that even if LOAC applies and a State has a right to act in self-
defense, the question remains as to whether the State using force in self-defense may vio-
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ment regime. This article limits its focus to the jus in bello issues—
specifically, when LOAC applies to extraterritorial hostilities with armed 
groups. 
 
II. APPROACHES TO APPLYING THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TO 
EXTRATERRITORIAL HOSTILITIES 
  
Generally, those who view the application of NIAC law as limited to inter-
nal armed conflicts maintain that extraterritorial hostilities may still be clas-
sified as an armed conflict.19 They differ, however, in how they characterize 
the armed conflict. Four main approaches have been put forth for how 
extraterritorial hostilities between States and armed groups can be classified 
under the law of armed conflict. 
Some, like the Bush administration in its initial position after 9/11,20 
have claimed that these armed conflicts fall entirely outside of the Geneva 
Conventions. The administration reasoned that because Article 3 Common 
                                                                                                                      
late another State’s sovereignty in order to do so—also an issue of jus ad bellum. This mat-
ter involves two competing rights: the right of the territorial State to its sovereignty (and, 
as such, to its territorial integrity) and the right of the victim-State to defend itself. If the 
territorial State is unwilling or unable to police the matter itself, then some argue that State 
loses partial right to its territorial integrity. The “unable and unwilling” test is taken from 
the law of neutrality found in three of the 1907 Hague Conventions. See Convention No. 5 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 
Oct.18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310; Convention No. 11 Relative to Certain Restrictions with Re-
gard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396; 
Convention No. 13 Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415. For some suggested criteria to determine when a State might 
be considered unwilling or unable, see Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Nor-
mative Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATION-
AL LAW 483 (2011). Issues of sovereignty do not arise if the territorial State gives consent 
to the victim-State. However, the basis for which a victim-State can use force in the terri-
tory of another State in the absence of consent is currently a controversial aspect of inter-
national law. These issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
19. Schondorf, supra note 11, at 30. A minority of commentators, however, consider 
that the extraterritorial application of violence must be governed by a law enforcement 
regime. See, e.g., Leila Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW 135, 140–41 (2004). Schondorf cites a number of com-
mentators who hold this view in Extra-State Armed Conflicts, supra note 11, at 14−15. 
20. See Memorandum from George Bush to Vice President et al., Humane Treatment 
of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002); Memorandum from John C. Yoo & 
Robert Delahunty to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: 
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002). 
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to the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) only applies within the 
territory of a State, the hostilities with Al Qaeda could not be categorized 
as a non-international armed conflict. At the same time, because the con-
flict did not occur between two States, it could not qualify as an interna-
tional armed conflict. The position that the conflict with Al Qaeda fell out-
side the purview of the Geneva Conventions was widely criticized around 
the world21 and rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan.22 Given the 
far-reaching and explicit denunciation of this option, it cannot be seen as a 
viable approach.  
Another view suggests that all conflicts that cross a border must qualify 
as international armed conflicts, even if one of the parties to the conflict is 
an armed group. The Israeli Supreme Court took this position in its 2006 
Targeted Killing case.23 Not all Israeli government statements, however, 
have endorsed the same view.24 Moreover, apart from the Israeli Supreme 
Court decision, few other States or commentators share this interpreta-
tion.25 The position contradicts the generally accepted understanding that 
                                                                                                                      
21. See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to 
Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 22, 2002), at A12, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/22/world/nation-challenged-captives-
behind-scenes-clash-led-bush-reverse-himself-applying.html (“Senior officials also dis-
closed for the first time that NATO allies were so concerned with Mr. Bush's initial deci-
sion to reject the conventions that Britain and France warned they might not turn over 
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters captured by their troops in Afghanistan unless Mr. Bush 
pledged to honor the treaties.”). 
22. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). See also John B. Bellinger III, State 
Department Legal Advisor, Foreign Press Center Briefing: Military Commissions Act of 
2006 (Oct. 19, 2006), audio available at http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/74786.htm. 
23. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 
2006 ¶ 18, (2) PD 459 [2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 
(2007), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34 
.pdf.   
24. See, e.g., ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: 
FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 29 (2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/ rdon-
lyres/E89E699D-A435-491B-B2D0-017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperationwLinks.pdf (“It 
is not yet settled which regime applies to cross-border military confrontations between a 
sovereign State and a non-State terrorist armed group operating from a separate territo-
ry.”).   
25. The International Criminal Court in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment, ¶ 541 (Mar. 14, 2012), explicitly states that extraterrito-
rial conflicts are not international unless the armed group is acting under the control of 
the State. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law 
and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 719, 725 (2007) [hereinafter ICRC 2007 Report on IHL and the Challenges of Con-
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international armed conflicts only occur between States, with the exception 
of the rare circumstances in which Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 
(AP I) applies or a belligerency is recognized. Although the holding of the 
Israeli Supreme Court could be used as evidence of emerging customary 
international law, there would need to be far more indications of State 
practice and opinio juris in order for this position to develop into a custom-
ary norm. In addition, this view leaves open the question of whether the 
full gamut of the Geneva Conventions would apply in the same manner as 
they would to inter-State conflicts. 
Still others have maintained that because extraterritorial conflicts with 
armed groups do not fit into the traditional categories of IACs or NIACs, a 
new category of conflict should be created.26 Under this view the legal 
principles applicable in NIACs and IACs could be adopted and tailored to 
suit extraterritorial conflicts,27 however, it is not clear exactly what rules 
would apply or what threshold would trigger such conflicts. While propo-
nents acknowledge that their view does not reflect the current state of the 
law, they suggest that it constitutes lege ferenda.28 This position has been 
countered in recent years by developments in jurisprudence, the practice of 
States and an increasing number of scholars.29  
The final alternative put forth—and one increasingly gaining ac-
ceptance—is that Common Article 3 and relevant customary international 
law pertaining to NIACs may be applied to extraterritorial conflicts. Those 
who hold this view do not consider it necessary to create a new category of 
conflict.30 Rather, they maintain that the existing law may be interpreted to 
                                                                                                                      
temporary Armed Conflict]. However, for support that such conflicts are international, see 
Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, 73–74, 77−78 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
ed., 2012).   
26. Schondorf, supra note 11 at 50−51. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of 
Armed Conflict, supra note 13.   
27. Schondorf, supra note 11 at 5−7, 10, 48; Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation 
of Armed Conflict, supra note 13; Corn & Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict, supra note 13, at 
5.   
28. See, e.g., Schondorf , supra note 11, at 9.  
29. See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 
93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 16 (2011); 31st ICRC Conference on 
IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15 (“There does not appear to be, in practice, any current 
situation of armed violence between organized parties that would not be encompassed by 
one of the two classifications . . . .”); Akande, supra note 25, at 71; NOAM LUBELL, EX-
TRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 127, 128 (2010).   
30. For a detailed assessment of why, in general, the existing regimes of either law en-
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apply extraterritorially. This approach thus moves away from the traditional 
understanding that the applicability of Common Article 3 is limited to in-
ternal armed conflicts. Today, this standpoint reflects the predominant 
trend. It was the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan and 
has been advanced by numerous commentators.31  
In sum, there is currently very little law or practice to support the first 
three options (that the Geneva Conventions do not apply, IAC law applies 
or a third category of conflict should be created). What is more, the fourth 
option (that NIAC law may apply extraterritorially) has garnered wide-
spread support. As such, this article focuses on the fourth view.   
 
III. EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Two types of non-international armed conflicts can be found in treaty law: 
those governed by Common Article 3 and those to which Additional Pro-
tocol II (AP II) applies.32 Importantly for the purposes of this article, 
Common Article 3 has a lower threshold of applicability than does AP II.33 
Its application therefore reflects the dividing line between situations of law 
enforcement and those of armed conflict. Not all hostilities amount to an 
armed conflict. Common Article 3 distinguishes between mere internal dis-
turbances and tensions and those situations that rise to the level of an 
                                                                                                                      
forcement or NIAC are sufficient, see Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and Inter-
national Humanitarian Law 25, 6 HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Winter 2006). See also 
SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 228–29 
(2012). 
31. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War, 22 LAW AND INEQUALITY 
195, 201(2004); SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 30, at 229. 
32. Some debate exists as to whether the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court establishes a third threshold of non-international armed conflict. However, the 
drafting history, jurisprudence and majority of scholars do not support this view. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(d), 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 87 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Dino Kritsiotis, The Tremors of Tadić, 
43 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 262, 288 (2010); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitari-
an Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 260–61 (2000); Anthony 
Cullen, The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in Article 8(2)(f), 12 JOUR-
NAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 419 (2007).   
33. A key distinguishing factor between the two regimes is that Article 1 of AP II re-
quires armed groups to have the ability to control territory.   
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armed conflict.34 Internal disturbances are not regulated by Common Arti-
cle 3, but instead are controlled by law enforcement rules, human rights 
and other applicable law. It is only once the threshold of an armed conflict 
is reached that Common Article 3 applies.   
Customary international law is particularly relevant in NIACs, given the 
dearth of treaty law rules. This article takes the position that the criteria 
triggering the application of Common Article 3 are the same as those re-
quired by customary international law to establish the existence of a NIAC. 
To conclude otherwise would create an additional category of conflict, an 
outcome that is generally rejected. The move in both treaty law and juris-
prudence towards making fewer distinctions in types of NIACs, rather than 
more,35 lends credence to viewing the Common Article 3 and customary 
law thresholds of armed conflict as synonymous. 
Common Article 3, widely considered to reflect customary international 
law,36 governs non-international armed conflicts between a State(s) and 
armed group(s), as well as those conflicts between armed groups.37 The full 
Article reads as follows:   
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the 
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
                                                                                                                      
34. The phrase “internal tensions and disturbances” is shortened to “internal disturb-
ances” throughout the article for clarity’s sake. Although taken from AP II, Article 1(2), 
and not explicitly found in Common Article 3, the rule is widely understood to be applica-
ble to Common Article 3. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 4472−73 (Yves 
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP II 
COMMENTARY]; Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 
620, 625 (Sept. 2, 1998); Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 84; Rome Statute, supra 
note 32, art. 8(2)d; UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 15.2.1; THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, at 616; International Committee of the Red 
Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.  
35. See, e.g., Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 22, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 
212. See generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2 volumes) (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]. 
36. Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 34, ¶ 608; Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 5, ¶¶ 116, 134; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27) [hereinafter ICJ Nicaragua Case].  
37. AP II COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 4461. THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATION-
AL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, at 609.   
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(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms 
and those placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, de-
tention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and 
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatso-
ever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a regu-
larly constituted court, affording all the judicial guaran-
tees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the 
Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should fur-
ther endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention. The application of the preceding provisions 
shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
 
Common Article 3 provides minimum standards for humane treatment 
of persons no longer taking part in hostilities. In addition, as a result of de-
velopments in customary international law, once Common Article 3 is trig-
gered, a number of LOAC rules governing the conduct of hostilities are 
also applicable.38 Strong support exists among commentators, jurispru-
dence and State practice for this interpretation,39 reinforcing the position 
                                                                                                                      
38. Whether one views that it is the application of conduct of hostilities rules to con-
flicts that have been triggered by Common Article 3, or that Common Article 3 is itself 
now interpreted to include conduct of hostilities rules, is not material to this analysis.   
39. Article 8(2)e of the Rome Statute supports the customary law status of some con-
duct of hostilities rules in NIACs. See also Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 170 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. 
Kordić and Čerkez, Motion to Dismiss the Amended Indictment for Lack of Jurisdiction 
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that the threshold for Common Article 3’s applicability is synonymous with 
that of a non-international armed conflict. Disagreement, however, exists 
as to exactly which rules on the conduct of hostilities reflect customary in-
ternational law.40   
As has been frequently pointed out, despite the important consequenc-
es resulting from its application, Common Article 3 does not specify when 
a situation amounts to an armed conflict.41 Three explicit requirements 
necessary to trigger Common Article 3 can be found in treaty law: (1) the 
existence of an armed conflict, (2) the armed conflict is not of an interna-
tional character and (3) the armed conflict takes place in the territory of 
                                                                                                                      
Based on the Limited Jurisdictional Reach of Articles 2 and 3, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Mar. 2, 1999). In addition, some recent conventions, which place 
limits on methods and means of warfare, apply to both IACs and NIACs. See, e.g., Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 
35, art. 22; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. See also THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW, supra note 10, at 614−16, 624−25; Robin Geiss, Armed Violence in Fragile 
States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third 
Parties, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 127, 133–34 (2009).     
40. The ICRC’s customary international law study, for instance, suggests that 147 of 
the 161 rules contained in the study are applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. CIHL Study, supra note 35. But see Letter from John 
Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, & William J. Haynes, General 
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study (Nov. 3, 
2006), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 514 (2007). The Tadić Appeals 
Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 5, ¶ 127, states that customary rules applicable in NI-
ACs include the “protection of civilians . . . from indiscriminate attacks, protection of 
civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all those who do not (or no 
longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed 
in inter-national armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.”   
41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 
246, 252 (Jan. 27, 2000); 1 MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW 
PROTECT IN WAR 109 (2d ed. 2011); LINDSEY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 31 (2002); COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 34, ¶¶ 
4448, 4450. Interestingly, the ICRC customary international law study does not address 
the criteria for the existence of a non-international armed conflict. CIHL STUDY, supra 
note 35. 
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one of the high contracting parties.42 In addition, although not explicit in 
the text, hostilities must surpass situations of internal disturbances in order 
for an armed conflict to exist.43 In any case, the existence of an armed con-
flict is determined through an assessment of the facts on the ground.44 
The ambiguity surrounding Common Article 3’s threshold of applica-
tion can be traced back to its codification in 1949. The groundbreaking in-
clusion of non-international armed conflicts in the regulatory framework of 
violence reflected a delicate compromise between States’ sovereign con-
cerns and the interests of humanity. The implicit exclusion of situations of 
internal disturbances from the purview of Common Article and the lack of 
clarity as to the threshold of the law’s applicability were a consequence of 
these underlying tensions. Governments traditionally have feared intrusion 
into their sovereign affairs. They considered the regulation by international 
law over their internal matters to be an incursion in their sovereignty that 
could affect their ability to maintain law and order and impact the national 
security of the State. States have also long been reluctant to grant any ap-
pearance of legitimacy to armed groups rebelling against their authority.45 
As a consequence of these factors, States considered that the violence had 
to reach a certain threshold—beyond internal disturbances—in order to 
justify what they considered to be interference in their internal affairs. 
Moreover, the lack of clarity as to Common Article 3’s threshold was seen 
to be beneficial as it offered flexibility to States to deny the existence of an 
armed conflict.46  
Humanitarian interests also played a role in requiring that the threshold 
surpass situations of internal disturbances. One of the underlying purposes 
of Common Article 3 is to bring a body of law into effect when the normal 
                                                                                                                      
42. Common Article 3: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international charac-
ter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties . . . .” 
43. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence, ¶ 93 (Dec. 6, 1999); Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 93; CULLEN, supra note 
11, at 131−32. 
45. This concern resulted in the last paragraph of Common Article 3 stating: “The 
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict.” See also AP II, supra note 6, art. 3(2). 
46. In fact, Common Article 3’s application has been frequently contested. The U.S. 
government, for instance, initially denied Common Article 3’s applicability to Al Qaeda 
after 9/11. See Meron, supra note 32, at 261 n.117; RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HU-
MAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 268 (2002). These authors provide a number of 
examples where States have denied Common Article 3’s applicability. See also G.I.A.D. 
Draper, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 114(I) RECUEIL DES COURS 57, 87–88 (1965). 
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system of law and order breaks down.47 For this reason, a distinction was 
made between internal disturbances and situations of armed conflict. The 
ambiguity surrounding the application of Common Article 3 was consid-
ered positive by some as it allowed for the necessary flexibility to deal with 
changing circumstances and the expansion of types of situations that could 
fall under it.48   
In more recent years, jurisprudence of international tribunals and State 
practice has provided some clarification for Common Article 3’s threshold. 
Today, Common Article 3 conflicts exist when the hostilities have reached 
a certain level of intensity and when the armed groups involved are suffi-
ciently organized.49 These two requirements, known as the Tadić test, were 
first articulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić Appeals Chamber judgment: “Armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.”50 
The key purpose underlying both criteria is to distinguish situations of 
internal disturbances from those of armed conflict.51 This test is now con-
sidered to be reflective of customary international law. Subsequent deci-
sions of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) have repeatedly relied on the Tadić test.52 Significantly, States draft-
                                                                                                                      
47. See, e.g., NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (2008). 
48. See, e.g., Draper, supra note 46, at 87; MOIR, supra note 41, at 33, 42; CULLEN, supra 
note 11, at 60; Heike Spieker, Twenty-Five Years After the Adoption of Additional Protocol II: 
Breakthrough or Failure of Humanitarian Legal Protection?, 4 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 141 (2001); GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 35. 
49. Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 5, ¶ 70. See, e.g., 31st ICRC Con-
ference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 8, 9. Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: 
A Role for International Law?, 75 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (2004).  
50. Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 5, ¶ 70 (emphasis added).   
51. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T ICTY, Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). See also: Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-
84-T, Judgment, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecu-
tor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 341 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-
96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); 
Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 32, ¶¶ 84, 89; Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 34, ¶ 
620. Musema Appeals Judgment, supra note 41, ¶ 248. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 
8(2)(f). 
52. See, e.g., Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 34, ¶ 620. Rutaganda Trial Judgment, 
supra note 44, ¶ 93; Tadić Trial Judgment, supra note 51, ¶¶ 561−62; Delalić Trial Judgment, 
supra note 51, ¶¶ 183−85; Prosecutor v. Krnojelac et al., Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 
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ing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court basically incorpo-
rated the Tadić test as the definition for the threshold of a NIAC.53 Various 
international bodies have turned to the Tadić test in order to determine the 
existence of an armed conflict.54 Some States, such as the United Kingdom, 
have explicitly cited the Tadić test in their military manuals.55 Finally, the 
majority of commentators today refer to the Tadić test as a reflection of the 
current state of law.56  
Jurisprudence from the ICTY has supplied a number of indicative fac-
tors that help to identify when the criteria of intensity and organization 
have been met. Factors suggesting that the requisite level of organization 
has been reached include:  
 
(1) the existence of a command structure;  
(2) an ability to carry out operations in an organized manner;  
(3) the level of logistics;  
(4) a level of discipline and ability sufficient to implement the basic 
obligations of Common Article 3; and  
(5) an ability to speak with one voice.57  
                                                                                                                      
¶ 51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et 
al., Case No. IT-96-23, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 56 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugosla-
via June 12, 2002); Kordić and Čerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 336; Limaj Trial 
Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 84; Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 
225 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003); Haradinaj Trial Judgment, 
supra note 51, ¶¶ 37–38; Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 175 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶¶ 18–21 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004). 
53. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 8(2)(f).   
54. See, e.g., International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, ¶¶ 74−76, 
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005). 
55. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 11, ¶ 15.3.1. As further evidence of State prac-
tice, see the Israeli government’s reference to the Tadić test, demonstrating that the con-
flict with Hamas could fulfill the requirements for a NIAC, even though as a matter of 
policy Israel applies both IAC and NIAC rules to its operations in Gaza. ISRAEL MINIS-
TRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS ¶ 
28 (2009).      
56. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE rule 23 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); Michael Cottier, in OTTO TRIFFTERER, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 291, 
292 (2d ed. 2008). 
57. Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 199−203, 277. See also Limaj Trial 
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The ICTY jurisprudence establishes the following factors as indicators 
that the required level of intensity has been reached:   
 
(1) the seriousness, increase and spread of clashes over territory and 
time;  
(2) the distribution and type of weapons;  
(3) government forces (number, presence in crisis area and the way 
force is used);  
(4) the number of casualties;  
(5) the number of civilians fleeing the combat zone;  
(6) the extent of destruction;  
(7) blocking, besieging and heavy shelling of towns;  
(8) the existence and change of front lines;  
(9) occupation of territory;  
(10) road closures; and  
(11)   UN Security Council attention.58  
 
While these factors are helpful, it must be highlighted that they are not 
requirements, but merely indicators. The minimum level of organization 
and intensity necessary in order for a non-international conflict to be trig-
gered continues to be debated.  
It is suggested here that the organized armed group must at least pos-
sess a responsible command and have the ability to abide by LOAC. The 
latter prerequisite can be read into the fact that Common Article 3 requires 
all parties to the conflict to fulfill certain obligations.59 In order to satisfy 
these requirements, the parties must also have the ability to abide by the 
applicable law. The criterion of a responsible command is implicit in 
                                                                                                                      
Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 90; Haradinaj Trial Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 64; Milosević Deci-
sion, supra note 52, ¶ 23; Prosecutor v. Djordjević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 
1525−26 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 23, 2011); Lubanga Trial Judg-
ment, supra note 25, ¶ 537. 
58. The Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶ 177. The Boškoski Trial Judgment is 
particularly useful as it summarizes previous ICTY case law as well as a discussion on rele-
vant national court decisions. Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶¶ 177−83. See also 
Djordjević Trial Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 1523; Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 25, ¶ 
538.   
59. Common Article 3: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international charac-
ter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions . . . .” (emphasis added). 
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Common Article 3, as evidenced by the drafting history,60 case law61 and 
the position taken by the majority of commentators.62 In addition, the fact 
that command responsibility is considered applicable to conflicts governed 
by Common Article 3 as a matter of customary international law today63 
lends support to this interpretation. Command responsibility is premised 
on, among other things, the existence of a responsible command.64 There-
fore, the customary law status of command responsibility recognizes that a 
responsible command is a required component for the existence of an 
armed conflict. 
 As with the organization requirement, opinions differ with regard to 
the level of intensity necessary for a situation to amount to a Common Ar-
ticle 3 conflict. In particular, it is debated whether the gravity of the vio-
lence or its duration (or protractedness) should be the determinative factor 
in reaching the necessary intensity threshold for an armed conflict to exist. 
In the Abella case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
placed more emphasis on the gravity of a situation over its duration.65 The 
                                                                                                                      
60. See, e.g., GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 36. 
61. See, e.g., Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶196; Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanov-
ić, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, ¶ 16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003). ICTY judgments vary as to the importance given to the 
duration factor.      
62. See, e.g., MOIR, supra note 41, at 36, 43; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & 
WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, COMMENTARY 
ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 
at 624–25 (1982). 
63. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 93, 
179 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006). See also Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(3), S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(3), an-
nexed to Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; 
Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 28. 
64. Although responsible command and command responsibility are two different 
concepts, they are related. See, e.g., Hadžihasanović Appeals Judgment, supra note 61, ¶ 16; 
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 54−55 (2009). Demon-
strating command responsibility entails a stricter test than finding that a responsible com-
mand exists. See, e.g., Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 89; METTRAUX, supra, at 56.    
65. The Abella case (also referred to as the Tablada case) concerns an attack on a mili-
tary barracks in Argentina by forty-two individuals in 1989. The battle lasted thirty hours 
and resulted in the death of twenty-nine of the attackers, as well as a number of the State 
officials. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that this situation con-
stituted an armed conflict governed by Common Article 3 and relevant customary interna-
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ICTY jurisprudence has generally held that both aspects matter, although 
the judgments are not always consistent in the emphasis placed on each 
factor.66 The ICTY approach of incorporating both components of intensi-
ty seems to be the predominant trend today.  
Until recently, the debate surrounding Common Article 3’s threshold 
of applicability paid little attention to the Article’s requirements that a con-
flict be “not of an international character” and take place “in the territory 
of a High Contracting party.” The drafting history and literal meaning of 
the text of Common Article 3 made clear that Common Article 3 was in-
tended to apply to internal armed conflicts.67 As a result, over the years 
States, commentators and jurisprudence have consistently understood the 
territorial scope of Common Article 3 to be restricted to internal armed 
conflicts.68   
This interpretation of Common Article 3 has been challenged in recent 
years for several reasons. Armed groups have grown in strength and ac-
quired an ability to act against States across multiple borders. At the same 
time, an increased recognition that internal conflicts often spill over into 
neighboring countries exists. These developments highlight the incon-
sistency between traditional State-centric, territorially bound views en-
trenched in the law of armed conflict and realities on the ground. Moreo-
ver, the long-standing resistance of States, which has permeated the devel-
opment, codification and enforcement of NIAC law, to concede to the ap-
                                                                                                                      
tional law. Abella v. Argentina, Case No. 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No.55/97, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶156 (1997). For a critique of this case, see 
Liesbeth Zegveld, The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and International Humanitar-
ian Law: A Comment on the Tablada Case, 324 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
505 (1998). 
66. See, e.g., Haradinaj Trial Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 49 (“The criterion of protracted 
armed violence has therefore been interpreted in practice, including by the Tadic Trial 
Chamber itself, as referring more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its dura-
tion.”); Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶ 186 (stating that the term “protracted” 
adds a “temporal element to the definition of armed conflict”), ¶ 185 (“In applying this 
test, what matters is whether the acts are perpetrated in isolation or as part of a protracted 
campaign that entails the engagement of both parties in hostilities.”). 
67. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 37. Schondorf, supra note 11, at 50; CUL-
LEN, supra note 11, at 49−51. 
68. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 11, at 383; GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 
37; CULLEN, supra note 11, at 49−51. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & 
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶ 1.1.1(a) (2006), reprinted in 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN 
(2006) (Special Supplement).   
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plication of Common Article 3 may be shifting for some States. The Unit-
ed States in its current global armed conflict against Al Qaeda is leading 
this move towards a wider application, rather than avoidance, of the law of 
armed conflict.  
Some scholars have identified the development of international human 
rights law and its accompanying restrictions to be an impetus for this 
shift.69 They suggest that as a result of the increasing constraints of human 
rights law, characterizing a situation as one of armed conflict actually allows 
States more flexibility in how they may lawfully deal with armed groups (in 
terms of targeting and detention).70 An additional contributing factor may 
be that in these situations the majority of the violence does not take place 
in the territory of the State fighting the armed group, but occurs on a sec-
ond State’s territory. As such, the fear of the fighting State that it might 
appear to lack an ability to maintain law and order is no longer present. 
This set of circumstances has evoked reaction and led to renewed debate 
within the international law community as to the conditions for the ap-
plicability of Common Article 3.71 One of the challenges today is if and 
how Common Article 3 applies extraterritorially.  
 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COMMON ARTICLE 3 
 
The prevailing view today is that Common Article 3 and relevant custom-
ary international law may apply to armed conflicts that are not international 
in character.72 This view re-interprets the geographic scope of Common 
Article 3 in accordance with the rules on treaty interpretation found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.73 It is based on a reading of 
                                                                                                                      
69. Kress, supra note 14, at 260−61; David Krezmer, Rethinking Application of IHL in 
Non-international Armed Conflicts, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 8 (2009). 
70. Kress, supra note 14, at 260−61; Krezmer, supra note 69, at 8. See also 31st ICRC 
Conference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 10 (“It should be borne in mind that 
IHL rules governing the use of force and detention for security reasons are less restrictive 
than the rules applicable outside of armed conflicts governed by other bodies of law.”). 
This is not to say that these States have abandoned the concern that acknowledging the 
existence of an armed conflict might be seen as bestowing legitimacy upon the armed 
group. The U.S. law that prohibits the provision of “material support” to designated for-
eign terrorist organizations (18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006)), which was upheld in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2075 (2010), is an example of the State’s fear 
of legitimizing various armed groups. 
71. See, e.g., Letter from Human Rights Watch, supra note 12.  
72. That is, any conflict not covered by Common Article 2 or AP I. 
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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Common Article 3 that corresponds with the text, the object and purpose 
of the Geneva Conventions,74 emerging practice of States,75 judicial deci-
sions and the views of prominent commentators.76 
The most frequently cited argument in support of this interpretation is 
that because the Geneva Conventions are universally ratified, the phrase 
“in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” has lost its signifi-
cance. According to a literal reading of the text, every armed conflict today 
takes place “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”77 
Moreover, an initial reason for the geographic restriction was to specify 
that only those States party to the Conventions would be bound by it. This 
distinction, too, no longer has relevance.78  
Simultaneously, more emphasis has been placed on the phrase “not of 
an international character.”79 This was the approach of the Supreme Court 
in the Hamdan decision, where the Court held that “[t]he term ‘conflict not 
of an international character’ is used . . . in contradistinction to a conflict 
                                                                                                                      
74. Id., art. 31, provides that treaties should be interpreted in good faith and in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning of the text, in the context of the treaty and with re-
gard to its object and purpose.  
75. Id., art. 31(3)b, provides that in addition to interpreting a treaty “in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in the light of its object and purpose,” “any subsequent practice in the application 
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” 
should be taken into account. 
76. Id., art. 32, specifies that supplementary means of interpretation (preparatory work 
and circumstances surrounding a treaty’s codification) may be resorted to when the trea-
ty’s meaning is “ambiguous or obscure” or “leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.” Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to judi-
cial decisions and the teachings of the “most highly qualified publicists” as subsidiary 
means of interpretation.  Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
77. This is the ICRC position. See International Committee of the Red Cross, How is 
the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, (Mar. 17, 2008), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. See also 
MOIR, supra note 41, at 31; Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitar-
ian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 69, 90 (2009). In addition, the drafting history, while clearly focused on purely in-
ternal armed conflicts, does not explicitly rule out the extraterritorial application of Com-
mon Article 3. Pejic, supra note 29, at 12, 13; LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF 
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (2002); SIVAKUMARAN, supra 
note 30, at 229, 230.   
78. See, e.g., Sassòli, supra note 30, at 9; SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 30, at 229; TALLINN 
MANUAL, supra note 56, cmt. to rule 23, ¶ 3.   
79. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 47, at 259. 
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between nations.”80 As a result of this decision, the United States’ position 
today is that it is engaged in a global conflict with Al Qaeda and its associ-
ates governed by Common Article 3.81  
In addition, restricting application of Common Article 3 to conflicts 
occurring within State borders does not comport with the object and pur-
pose of the Article. Such an interpretation could result in a gap in protec-
tion of the vulnerable. For example, in a spill-over conflict this position 
essentially means that a “party’s humanitarian law obligations would stop at 
the border,”82 even though the hostilities and need for the law would not 
necessarily cease at that point. This gap in protection “could not be ex-
plained by States’ concerns about their sovereignty.”83 The ICRC’s position 
                                                                                                                      
80. Hamdan, supra note 22, ¶ 67. The Supreme Court also held that Common Article 3 
“is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it 
does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, 
the phrase ‘not of an international character’ bears its literal meaning.” Id. 
81. See, e.g., DOJ White Paper, supra note 1, at 3 (“The United States is currently in a 
non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its associated forces.”); Memorandum 
from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments et al. on the 
Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of De-
tainees in the Department of Defense 1 (July 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DepSecDef%20memo%20on%20common%20artic
le%203.pdf (“The Supreme Court has determined that Common Article 3 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 applies as a matter of law to the conflict with Al Qaeda.”); Human 
Rights Council, United States of America, National Report Submitted in Accordance with 
Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/1 (Aug. 23, 2010). It should be noted that a number of official 
statements demonstrate that the United States views itself as being in an armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda without specifying whether that conflict is an IAC or NIAC. See, e.g., Koh, 
supra note 17, at 14; John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adher-
ing to Our Values (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-
values-an [hereinafter Brennan Speech at Harvard]; THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD 2, 3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ counter-
terrorism_strategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM]. See 
also John Bellinger, Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda?, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2007), 
http://opiniojuris.org /2007/01/15/armed-conflict-with-al-qaida/. 
82. See Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY 
ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 87 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Su-
san Breau eds., 2007); Pejic, supra note 29, at 6; Pejic, supra note 49, at 85; Sassòli, supra 
note 30, at 9. 
83. Sassòli, supra note 30, at 9. 
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is that Common Article 3 continues to bind both parties to the conflict, 
even if a border is crossed, as occurs in spill-over and cross-border con-
flicts.84 Several judicial developments also point to the applicability of 
Common Article 3 extraterritorially. The ICTR Statute, for example, in-
cludes jurisdiction over crimes committed across the Rwandan border in 
neighboring countries.85 This suggests that the parties to the conflict, rather 
than the territorial boundaries, determine the geographic reach of Common 
Article 3.86    
In sum, although it cannot be said categorically that Common Article 3 
applies extraterritorially as a matter of customary international law,87 the 
prevailing view maintains that Common Article 3 and relevant customary 
international law can govern extraterritorial hostilities. A consequence of 
this interpretation is an emphasis on the parties to the conflict, reducing 
the importance of territory.88  
 
V. ORGANIZATION, INTENSITY, AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY—GAPS AND 
INCONSISTENCIES 
 
Assuming that the law applicable to NIACs can govern extraterritorial hos-
tilities, the question then arises as to how this reduction of the territorial 
element might impact the conditions widely considered necessary to estab-
lish the existence of an armed conflict. Specifically, does this extension of 
the law’s application have an effect on how the organization and intensity 
requirements apply to extraterritorial hostilities? 
It is well accepted that the application of Common Article 3 requires 
the parties to the conflict be organized and the intensity of the conflict 
reach a certain level.89 This test must also be used in determining whether 
Common Article 3 applies extraterritorially.90 To conclude otherwise would 
essentially signify the creation of a third legal category of non-international 
armed conflicts, entailing the establishment of an additional threshold of 
                                                                                                                      
84. 31st ICRC Conference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 9, 10.      
85. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 63, arts. 1, 7. 
86. ZEGVELD, supra note 77, at 136; Sassòli, supra note 30, at 9.   
87. Pejic, supra note 29, at 17. 
88. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 30, at 232. 
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
90. Leading commentators and judgments from the international tribunals support 
this view. See, e.g., Marco Sassòli, The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo under International 
Humanitarian Law, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 99−100 (2004); 
Kress, supra note 14, at 261; Pejic, supra note 49, at 86, 87.   
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application and clarification of what rules would then apply. Generating a 
new category of conflict contradicts the current trend in LOAC toward 
either reducing the types of NIACs or accepting the existing categories 
found in Common Article 3 and AP II.91   
Despite an acknowledgment that Common Article 3 and relevant cus-
tomary international law can apply extraterritorially, the majority of inter-
pretations do not assess the territorial scope of Common Article 3 together 
with the organization and intensity requirements. For example, the Hamdan 
decision notably does not refer to the organization and intensity criteria, 
although it embraces the extraterritorial application of Common Article 3. 
The Tadić test, as developed in ICTY jurisprudence, does not seem to have 
envisioned extraterritorial hostilities.92 This is not to suggest that the organ-
ization and intensity requirements do not apply to extraterritorial hostilities, 
but rather to question how they apply. Given that the LOAC system has 
traditionally been structured territorially, are there any consequences to re-
ducing the relevance of State boundaries?  
Moreover, while commentators and States seem to consider that 
Common Article 3 and the Tadić test apply to extraterritorial hostilities, 
there are inconsistencies in the rationale for the type of extraterritorial con-
flicts deemed to be covered by NIAC law. Considerable support exists for 
the position that borders do not matter when establishing Common Article 
3 and the Tadić test’s applicability to spill-over conflicts,93 and even to 
cross-border conflicts.94 The logic, however, seems to change when the 
discussion turns to “global” conflicts.95 There appears to be a reluctance to 
                                                                                                                      
91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
92. Arimatsu points out that “[f]or the ICTY the only ‘geography question’ that re-
quired clarification was to ascertain the reach of the law within the state; the extraterritorial 
reach of the rules was simply not considered.” Arimatsu, supra note 2, at 187 (emphasis 
added). See also Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the 
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 36−37 (2010).   
93. HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, 
COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR 
AND MISSILE WARFARE ¶ 2(a)5 (2010) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY]. But see 
Geiss, supra note 39, at 138, for the view that the issue remains unresolved.   
94. 31st ICRC Conference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 10. Less consensus 
exists as to how the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezollah should best be character-
ized. This uncertainty is compounded by the complexity of the situation. For example, was 
the conflict internationalized due to overall control of Hezbollah by an outside State?  
95. 31st ICRC Conference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 10 (“It should be 
reiterated that the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global dimensions is or 
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accept that Common Article 3 and relevant customary international law 
may apply to “global” conflicts without regard to State borders. 
Part of the criticism involves skepticism that the armed groups in vari-
ous countries actually form a single party to a distinct conflict. There is also 
unease with the idea that the law of armed conflict may apply in countries 
where the level of violence is very low. It seems that territory does still play 
a role for some commentators,96 despite acceptance of the extraterritorial 
application of Common Article 3 and relevant customary international law. 
In addition, the practice of a number of States does not support the United 
States’ position that territorial boundaries are irrelevant for the application 
of the law in NIACs.97 Taken to its logical conclusion, this position would 
appear to suggest that the organization and intensity criteria should be as-
sessed per territory for “global” conflicts. Yet, it seems inconsistent to main-
tain on one hand that territorial borders do not stop the application of 
Common Article 3 to spill-over and cross-border conflicts and, on the other 
hand, to say that the applicability of Common Article 3 (thus LOAC) must 
be determined on a case-by-case basis according to territorial constraints 
with regard to a “global” armed conflict.  
An underlying reason for this inconsistency may be the traditional sep-
aration of the “protection” and “conduct of hostilities” rules in LOAC. 
Common Article 3 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions as a whole deal with 
protective measures (known as “Geneva law”), while the 1907 Hague 
Regulations concern rules on the conduct of hostilities (known as “Hague 
law”). It was not until 1977 that the Additional Protocols combined both 
the “protection” and “conduct of hostilities” rules into one treaty. It may 
be that the tendency to push for the application of the protective side of 
the law, while viewing the conduct of hostilities side as too permissive, 
                                                                                                                      
has been taking place.”). See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, “Unlawful/Enemy Combatants”: Interpretations 
and Consequences, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE 
FAULTLINES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 335, 346 (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Jelena Pejic eds., 2007) (discussing the bombings in Madrid, London, Bali, New Delhi    
and other places).  
96. Sassòli, supra note 30 at 8 (“It is not clear to this author why a situation, which is 
not an armed conflict when it arises on the territory of only one state, should be an armed 
conflict when it spreads over the territory of several states.”). See also Pejic, supra note 29, 
at 8, 9. 
97. Brennan Speech at Harvard, supra note 81. See also Kress, supra note 14, at 266; Pe-
jic, supra note 95, at 346; Sassòli, supra note 30, at 10 (referring to the law enforcement 
response by the Spanish and UK governments to terrorist attacks on their soil in 2004 and 
2005). 
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stems from this traditional division. Although as a matter of black letter law 
Common Article 3 only contains protection provisions, as noted, once the 
Article is triggered, so too are the customary rules on conduct of hostilities 
applicable to NIACs.98 To separate the two tracks would complicate the 
application of the law (e.g., what would the threshold of application be for 
each?). 
Setting aside these dual strands in the development of LOAC, an ac-
knowledgment that Common Article 3 and customary international law 
apply extraterritorially suggests that an assessment of the intensity and or-
ganization requirements cannot be conducted separately per country. Even 
in accepting this conclusion, however, the concern remains that if the terri-
torial restrictions are removed when establishing the existence of an armed 
conflict over multiple, geographically dispersed States, what constraints 
within LOAC remain?99  
It is suggested that territory does still play a role in determining when 
an armed conflict exists, particularly in the case of “global” armed conflicts. 
Problems arise if the manner in which the threshold of a NIAC has been 
determined in internal conflicts is simply transposed to those conflicts that 
are geographically dispersed across numerous territories. Two issues in par-
ticular may challenge the way in which the organization and intensity crite-
ria are applied to “global” armed conflicts. The first concerns the matter of 
links between armed groups—can violence conducted by various armed 
groups that are linked to one another be conglomerated in order to fulfill 
the intensity requirement? If so, what must the nature of the link be? Sec-
ond, can violence that is dispersed over large geographic spaces be amassed 
in order to meet the requisite level of intensity for the existence of an 
armed conflict? In addition, the underlying purpose of the requirements 
may be affected by a shift in State sovereignty. These factors are now ex-
amined. 
 
                                                                                                                      
98. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
99. See, e.g., Geiss, supra note 39, at 138: 
 
Clearly, a sweeping and global application of IHL without any territorial con-
fines whatsoever is not maintainable owing to the unjustifiable worldwide dero-
gations from human rights law this would bring about, and in light of the very 
object and purpose of IHL, i.e. to provide relatively basic but feasible standards 
in areas where the reality of armed conflict simply forestalls the application of 
more protective (human rights) standards.   
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A. Organized Armed Group Criterion 
 
In general, it does not appear that the geographical extension of the law 
presents insurmountable difficulties for the criterion of an organized armed 
group in and of itself. The Tadić test requires that at least one of the parties 
consist of an organized armed group. Likewise, a consequence of the extra-
territorial application of Common Article 3 is an emphasis on the parties to 
the conflict over the territorial constraints. In this way, the law of armed 
conflict can be said to follow the parties to the conflict. This logic can be 
seen in the widespread understanding today that Common Article 3 applies 
to spill-over conflicts.100 Therefore, even if the conflict spans several coun-
tries without geographic proximity, there still must be an identifiable party 
that fulfills the requirements of an organized armed group. Corresponding-
ly, to require that the existence of an organized armed group be separately 
assessed in each country would not be consistent with the acceptance that 
the law may apply across State boundaries. The United States, for example, 
acknowledges the relevance of the organized armed group requirement in 
conducting its global war on Al Qaeda and its associates.101   
Where controversy arises is with regard to what constitutes an orga-
nized armed group102 and who is considered to be a member of that group. 
In particular, the question of whether armed groups organized in net-
worked structures exhibit sufficient organization is crucial for establishing 
whether an armed conflict exists. Despite its importance, the issue is not 
specific to the geographical matter discussed here. Similar challenges could 
arise in the context of a purely internal conflict. At most, it could be argued 
that large geographical distances may make it more difficult for an armed 
group to be adequately organized (i.e., possess some of the indicative fac-
tors for organization, such as having a command structure and a level of 
                                                                                                                      
100. See, e.g., 31st ICRC Conference on IHL CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 9, 10; 
AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 93, ¶ 2(a)5; THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, at 605, 607. 
101. See Koh, supra note 17, at 13 (where he mentions that Al Qaeda is an organized 
armed group). See also Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel of the U.S. Department of 
Defense at the Oxford Union, Oxford University: The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its 
Affiliates: How Will It End? (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=cun8o2sDJgE  [hereinafter Johnson Oxford Speech].  
102. The United States’ determination that Al Qaeda is an organized armed group has 
generated criticism. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War (?) against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 25, at 421, 425−28 (where he 
questions who exactly forms the armed group). 
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discipline that provides an ability to abide by the law). However, the com-
ponents required for an organized armed group as such, do not change due 
to a geographical extension of the law’s application. Likewise, the location 
of the conflict does not affect the determination of whether an individual is 
a member of an organized armed group. While it could be argued that the 
practical challenges of gathering intelligence in a second State may present 
additional obstacles to verifying that a particular individual is a group 
member, the same disputed legal questions on membership that surface in 
internal conflicts arise wherever the conflict is situated.103  
B. Party to the Conflict, Conglomeration of Violence and Links between Armed 
Groups  
 
Particular difficulties may arise in establishing that distinct organized armed 
groups are part of a single identifiable party. An organized armed group is 
not necessarily equivalent to a party to the conflict. The party to the con-
flict may be the organized armed group, it may have an armed wing that 
constitutes the organized armed group104 or the party may consist of multi-
ple organized armed groups.105 With regard to the latter, the law does not 
specify the nature of the link required between multiple organized armed 
groups and a party to the conflict in a NIAC in order for them to form a 
single identifiable party.  
Clarifying what constitutes an identifiable party is intricately connected 
to the intensity requirement. Even if each armed group fulfills the orga-
nized armed group criterion, a question remains as to how the intensity 
requirement is to be met. Specifically, can all of the violence that occurs as 
                                                                                                                      
103. The membership question is hotly debated. The main disagreement is about 
which members of an organized armed group may be targeted and when. See INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 58 (Nils Melzer 
ed., 2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH Guidance]. See also ICRC Clarification Process on the Notion 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (Proceedings), INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (June 30, 2009), http://www.icrc.org 
/eng/resources/documents/article/other/direct-participation-article-020709.htm.   
104. See ICRC DPH Guidance, supra note 103, at 32. 
105. Common Article 3 refers to the obligations of “parties” to the conflict, which 
does not rule out more than one organized armed group. Moreover, the Commentary to AP 
II refers to “insurgents who are organized in armed groups,” suggesting that multiple armed 
groups might be a part of the party to the conflict under AP II. AP II COMMENTARY, 
supra note 34, ¶ 4460 (emphasis added).   
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a result of hostilities with various armed groups be aggregated in order to 
meet the intensity criterion, or must the level of violence be separately as-
sessed vis-à-vis each armed group? The response to this question may af-
fect whether or not a situation rises to the level of an armed conflict.  
The growing acceptance that NIAC law may also apply extraterritorially 
has brought this issue of links to the forefront in recent years. Although 
the difficulty arises in internal armed conflicts as well, once territorial con-
straints are removed from the law’s application, it is less obvious that 
armed groups are part of the same conflict. As a result, the need to ascer-
tain links between these groups increases.  
Strictly speaking, it is the hostilities that take place between the specific 
parties to the conflict that must surpass a level of sporadic violence. It is a 
well-accepted view that separate conflicts may exist in parallel.106 Conse-
quently, multiple conflicts may exist side-by-side in the same region. Today 
many armed groups simultaneously participate in hostilities to varying de-
grees in a single conflict space. However, in practice, it appears that in 
some internal NIACs the intensity requirement is not always assessed indi-
vidually per armed group, but rather through aggregating the violence as a 
whole. In Iraq, for example, between 2003 and 2009 some estimate that 
over seventy armed groups existed.107 Alliances among and between the 
armed groups frequently shifted,108 making it difficult to conclude that 
these armed groups formed a single party to a conflict. Yet, separate as-
sessments were not carried out vis-à-vis each armed group in order to as-
certain that the hostilities between specific groups fulfilled the intensity re-
quirement. In reality, the violence conducted by and against each of these 
groups did not fulfill the criterion of intensity in every case, yet the armed 
groups were treated as being part of an armed conflict in Iraq.109 Similar 
observations can be made with regard to the current conflict in Syria.110  
                                                                                                                      
106. See, e.g., Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 5, ¶¶ 72−74; ICJ Nica-
ragua Case, supra note 36, ¶ 219. 
107. Rule of Law Armed Conflicts Project: Iraq, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS , http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/non-state_armed_groups.php?id_state=110 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2013). Other armed conflicts, such as those in Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia have involved multiple armed groups.   
108. The Mehdi Army for example changed sides a number of times. 
109. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Iraq (2003 onwards), in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 25, at 356, 371 (“There is no question but 
that the fighting in Iraq was sufficiently widespread and intense to meet the violence 
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Part of the reason for this circumstance could be because it can be dif-
ficult to isolate the specific group that conducted each attack and to assign 
to a particular group some of the indicative factors used to ascertain that 
the intensity requirement is fulfilled (e.g., determining which group’s vio-
lence is responsible for fleeing civilians and refugees) given the shared terri-
tory. In a way, the common territory serves to link the violence undertaken 
by these various armed groups. 
The question has relevance for characterizing the conflict and targeting. 
If such an assessment results in the conclusion that a NIAC exists along-
side situations of violence that do not reach the threshold of a NIAC (i.e., 
law enforcement situations), members of the armed group would need to 
be dealt with through law enforcement means or be treated as civilians di-
rectly participating in hostilities. 
Not only has there been little emphasis on separating out the intensity 
of violence generated from each armed group,111 but also little attention has 
been given to determining the type of link required to render multiple 
armed groups part of a single party. This is in notable contrast to the dis-
cussion and practice that surrounds the determination of whether parallel 
IACs and NIACs exist in a country.112 It is not clear, even for internal 
                                                                                                                      
threshold or that many of the entities active in the fray amounted to ‘organized armed 
groups.’”).  
110. The Rule of Law Armed Conflicts Project: Syria identifies the Syrian Free Army 
as the main armed group, but also lists the following additional armed groups: Syrian 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Fighting Vanguard, Islamic Liberation Party, Islamic 
Liberation, Mohammad’s Youth, God’s Soldiers and Al-Qaeda. Rule of Law Armed Conflicts 
Project: Syria, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS , http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/non-state_armed 
_groups.php?id_state=211 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). More recently, the Syrian Islamic 
Liberation Front formed as a prominent umbrella organization for Islamist groups. Syria's 
Islamist rebels join forces against Assad, REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/us-syria-crisis-rebels-idUSBRE89A0Y 
920121011. For a detailed overview of Islamist groups, see Holy Warriors: A Field Guide to 
Syria’s Jihadi Groups, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com 
/articles/2012/10/15/holy_warriors. 
111. Although this practice is by no means uniform. For a list of the separate NIACs 
occurring in Colombia between the Colombian State and various armed groups and be-
tween armed groups, see, e.g., Felicity Szesnat & Annie R. Bird, Colombia, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 25, at 203, 227. It 
should be noted that the distinction made here was between NIACs governed by AP II 
and those by Common Article 3.  
112. For example, the 2011 Libyan conflict could be seen as entailing an IAC between 
NATO forces and the Libyan government, alongside a NIAC between the Libyan rebels 
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armed conflicts, if an additional factor must be considered that links armed 
groups to a party to the conflict in a NIAC.   
 The questions of what link is required between an organized armed 
group and a party to the conflict and how the intensity criterion is assessed 
take on increased significance when applied to an extraterritorial context. 
In particular, when it comes to a global armed conflict, the lack of clarity 
has generated disquiet.113 The United States claims to be in a “global” 
armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.114 The argument is that these 
affiliated armed groups are connected and collectively constitute a threat to 
the United States. Therefore, they are part of the same conflict, which hap-
pens to be spread out geographically.  
However, to simply transfer the model of establishing the requisite lev-
el of intensity that is sometimes used in practice in internal (or even region-
al) armed conflicts to a global armed conflict creates problems. Most im-
portantly, the degree to which these affiliated groups are, in fact, part of the 
same conflict is less clear in situations spread out across multiple States. 
Territory no longer serves as a presupposed link between the armed groups 
that connects the violence. Hostilities undertaken by an affiliated group 
may be part of an entirely separate conflict. For example, the majority of 
fighting conducted by groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, such as Al Shabaab 
in Somalia, often takes place as part of separate internal conflicts.115 Al 
Shabaab’s interests and targets are predominantly local.116 
                                                                                                                      
and the Libyan government. Likewise, in Afghanistan in 2001, an IAC existed in parallel 
with a NIAC. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International 
Armed Conflict, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY 119 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies). See Vité for some practical concerns in having a “differen-
tiated approach.” Vité, supra note 77, at 86.   
113. See, e.g., ICRC 2007 Report on IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflict, supra note 25, at 725; Pejic, supra note 95, at 346; LUBELL, supra note 29, at 117; 
SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 30, at 233. 
114. See, e.g., John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: Securing 
the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience and Values (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-
security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi [hereinafter Brennan Remarks at CSIS] 
(“We are at war against al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates.”). 
115. See, e.g., Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of 
James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 
US Intelligence Community 4, 5 (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/files 
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At the same time, the law does not specify how multiple organized 
armed groups might be part of a single party to a conflict in NIACs. Part 
of the problem is that the test for the existence of an armed conflict has 
been articulated in terms of the organized armed group requirement in 
some cases (the Tadić test) and at other times in terms of a party to the con-
flict (Common Article 3). Over the years little attention or clarification has 
been given to this issue of what constitutes a party to a conflict in NI-
ACs.117  
The United States claims to be in an armed conflict not only with Al 
Qaeda, but also with affiliated groups.118 These affiliates include Al Qaida 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al 
Shabaab, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Boko Haram (although not formally).119 Pe-
jic pertinently questions whether the violent acts committed since 9/11 
have stemmed from the same group, or if distinct armed groups have car-
ried them out: “[C]an it be said that the totality of terrorist acts that have 
been perpetrated since 11 September 2011—in Bali, Moscow, Peshawar, 
Casablanca, Riyadh, Madrid, Istanbul, Beslan, London, Egypt, and else-
where—constitute a global non-international armed conflict that can be 
attributed to one and the same party?”120  
                                                                                                                      
/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%2
0Mar%202013.pdf [hereinafter Clapper Statement].   
116. See Stanford University, Al-Shabab, MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61 (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013); NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, COUNTERTERRORISM 2013 
CALENDAR: AL-SHABAB, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (Al-Shabab’s 
fighters “are predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the TFG [Transi-
tional Federal Government of Somalia] and not supportive of global jihad”). See, e.g., 
Clapper Statement, supra note 115, at 4, 5. 
117. See, e.g., Bahia Tahzib-Lie & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Determining the Threshold for 
the Application of International Humanitarian Law, in MAKING THE VOICE OF HUMANITY 
HEARD: ESSAYS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN HONOUR OF HRH PRINCESS MARGRIET OF THE NETHERLANDS 248 (Liesbeth 
Lijnzaad, Johanna Van Sambeek & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004) (they point out the im-
portance of the relationship between non-State parties, but do not specify what this rela-
tionship might entail). 
118. See, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 81, at 3; 
Brennan Remarks at CSIS, supra note 114.   
119. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2011: STRA-
TEGIC ASSESSMENT (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195540 
.htm. 
120. Pejic, supra note 49, at 86, 87. See also Kress, supra note 14, at 261; SIVAKUMA-
RAN, supra note 30, at 233.    
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Whether these armed groups form a single party to a conflict rests on 
the degree and type of connection required. Some have suggested that an 
armed group’s declaration of allegiance to the identified party to the con-
flict (such as was the case with Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in 2012)121 suffic-
es for a determination that the affiliated group is part of the same armed 
conflict. The U.S. government has introduced the terms “associated forc-
es”122 and “co-belligerents”123 to describe those armed groups that are affil-
iated with Al Qaeda and thus part of the global conflict.124 The meaning 
and legal basis of these terms are unclear, however. The term “associated” 
is not found within LOAC. While the concept of “co-belligerency” does 
surface in international law, it stems from the law of neutrality and pertains 
only to States.125 Application of the law of neutrality to hostilities with 
armed groups is not generally accepted. 
                                                                                                                      
121. Al Shabaab declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in February 2012. Bill Rogio, So-
mali Islamist Group Formally Declares Allegiance to Shabaab, al Qaeda, LONG WAR JOURNAL 
(Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/somali_islamist_ 
grou.php. 
122. See, e.g., DOJ White Paper supra note 1, at 2; NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUN-
TERTERRORISM, supra note 81, at 3 n.1 (“Associated Forces is a legal term of art that refers to 
cobelligerents of al-Qa‘ida or the Taliban against whom the President is authorized to use 
force (including the authority to detain) based on the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).” National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, §1021, 125 Stat.1298, 1562 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf (refers to 
“associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.”). Although the specification falls under the heading of the authority to detain, 
statements like the one above indicate that the U.S. government also uses that phrase to 
signify the parties to the armed conflict in which it is engaged. The United States also re-
fers to “adherents” or “individuals” associated with Al Qaeda. See, for example, the defi-
nition provided in the NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 81, at 
3.    
123. Johnson Oxford Speech, supra note 101 (“We have publicly defined an ‘associat-
ed force’ as having two characteristics: (1) an organized, armed group that has entered the 
fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the 
United States or its coalition partners.”). 
124. The White House has defined “affiliates” as “[g]roups that have aligned with al-
Qa‘ida.” NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 81, at 3 (emphasis 
added). But it acknowledges in that document that the term is not a legal one. Id. at 3 n.1.   
125. This was acknowledged in a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Colombia Circuit, which stated: 
 
[T]he laws of co-belligerency affording notice of war and the choice to remain neu-
tral have only applied to nation states. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE § 74 (1st ed. 1906). The 55th [Arab Brigade, which included Al Qaeda 
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Although the law is silent with regard to links between armed groups in 
NIACs, the concept of links can be found under LOAC for a number of 
other purposes—namely the criterion of “belonging to a party” used for 
determining combatant and prisoner of war (POW) status in IACs;126 the 
connections necessary to establish a system of responsible command; the 
two concepts of belligerent nexus used to prove individual criminal respon-
sibility127 and direct participation in hostilities,128 respectively; and the link 
of “overall control” required to internationalize a NIAC.129 Given the lack 
of explicit law on the matter, the question examined here is whether any of 
these existing concepts can be used by analogy for the purpose of deter-
mining links between armed groups in a NIAC? 
The closest analogy would seem to be to the “belonging to” criterion 
found under GC III. In order to incorporate an organized armed group 
into an existing IAC for the purpose of establishing POW and combatancy 
status, that group must “belong to” a State party to the conflict. At face 
value, it might seem logical to apply a similar criterion to organized armed 
groups that are linked to one another in NIACs. A simple transferal of the 
IAC concept to NIACs, however, is problematic. First, and most im-
portantly, the prerequisite was developed for the specific purpose of estab-
lishing qualifications that only exist in international armed conflicts (i.e., 
POW and combatancy status). Second, the type of link necessary to fulfill 
the “belonging to” requirement is debated even under IAC law. It is not 
                                                                                                                      
members within its command structure] clearly was not a state, but rather an irregu-
lar fighting force present within the borders of Afghanistan at the sanction of the 
Taliban. Any attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be 
folly, akin to this court ascribing powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of 
the Freemasons. 
 
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
126. GC III, supra note 4, art. 4(A)(2) (“Members of other militias and members of 
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a 
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory . . . .”) (emphasis add-
ed); AP I, supra note 4, art. 43 (“The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all or-
ganized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that 
Party for the conduct of its subordinates . . . .”) (emphasis added).   
127. See, e.g., Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note 52, ¶ 58; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
Case No. ICTR-96–3, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 570 (May 26, 2003). 
128. ICRC DPH Guidance, supra note 103, at 58. 
129. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 122, 156 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals Judgment].  
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clear whether the criterion calls for a link of control or coordination.130 
Thus, transferring the concept to NIACs will not likely provide greater 
clarity.  
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities under International Humanitarian Law does introduce the idea that an 
organized armed group may “belong to” a party to the conflict in a NI-
AC.131 The Guidance’s interpretation of the concept is taken from the third 
Geneva Convention and corresponds with those who consider that a link 
of coordination suffices (as opposed to control).132 There are, however, 
several concerns in relying on the Guidance’s articulation of “belonging to” 
in NIACs. Most importantly, the Guidance does not provide a legal basis for 
the inclusion of this criterion in NIACs. Rather, it extends the meaning of 
“belonging to” established for the purpose of determining POW and com-
batancy status in IACs to a NIAC context, where such status does not ex-
ist.133 Moreover, the Guidance seems to conflate the vernacular use for 
whether an individual belongs to an armed group, with the legal notion de-
                                                                                                                      
130. For the interpretations that tend to view the link as one of coordination, see, e.g., 
GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 57 (Article 4); Michael N. Schmitt Humanitarian 
Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHICAGO 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 528 (2005). Examples of those who view the link as 
one of control are Hays Parks, Combatants, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 247, 269 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2012) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College Inter-
national Law Studies) and the Israeli Military Court in Military Prosecutor v. Kassem (Israeli 
Military Court, Apr. 13, 1971), reprinted in 42 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 476, 477 
(1971). 
131. ICRC DPH Guidance, supra note 103, at 31 (“Organized armed groups belonging 
to a non-State party to an armed conflict include both dissident armed forces and other 
organized armed groups.”) (emphasis added). While the Guidance’s discussion focuses on 
targeting, its proposal leaves room for the interpretation that multiple armed groups could 
be linked to one party in a NIAC. It should be noted the Guidance does not constitute law. 
However, it may influence the way in which the law develops. 
132. The Guidance requires that there is “at least a de facto relationship between an 
organized armed group and a party to the conflict” and considers that “conclusive behav-
iour that makes clear for which party the group is fighting” would suffice. Id. at 23. The 
Guidance takes this definition directly from the ICRC Commentary to the Third Geneva 
Convention. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 57 (Article 4). 
133. In addition, the same criticism that the Guidance has received for requiring that an 
organized armed group belong to a party to an IAC applies in the case of NIACs. Some 
consider it problematic to use a criterion that exists for the purposes of detention in order 
to determine who may be targeted. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance: A 
Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 18 (2009). It should also be 
noted that the Guidance discusses the criterion in the context of targeting, rather than for 
the purposes of establishing the existence of an armed conflict.     
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veloped under the law of armed conflict for whether or not an armed 
group “belongs to” a party to an IAC.134 Given these factors, employing 
the “belonging to” link by analogy may lead to further complication, rather 
than clarifying the circumstances for when organized armed groups may be 
linked to one another for the purpose of establishing when an armed con-
flict exists.  
Another reasonable analogy might be to require that the organized 
armed group falls under a responsible command of a party to the conflict. 
If the affiliated group were required to be under the responsible command 
of the party to the conflict, a stronger link would be necessary than, for 
example, simply sharing a common ideology with, or being inspired by, Al 
Qaeda.135 In the case of groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, the fact that armed 
groups pledge allegiance or change their name does not mean they become 
part of Al Qaeda’s command structure.136 Accordingly, some of the groups 
affiliated with Al Qaeda would not form part of a single identifiable party 
to the conflict under this interpretation. They could still be parties to sepa-
rate armed conflicts if the intensity criterion was fulfilled. A benefit of turn-
ing to responsible command for establishing the link is that the concept 
already exists in NIAC law.137 The difficulty is that being part of a respon-
sible command would likely necessitate a high threshold of control. For 
instance, the link required by a responsible command would likely not en-
compass organized armed groups that act in a coordinated manner, a cir-
cumstance that frequently occurs today.   
An analogy to a belligerent nexus also raises concerns. Most significant-
ly, the concepts of belligerent nexus currently found in the law (both as 
used to establish individual criminal responsibility and as a constitutive el-
ement of direct participation in hostilities) pertain to the relationship be-
tween the acts of an individual and an armed conflict. Such a relationship 
                                                                                                                      
134. For example, the COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 
34, ¶ 4789, uses the term “belonging to” with reference to membership into a group in a 
NIAC (“[t]hose who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time”) 
(emphasis added). 
135. See, e.g., ICRC 2007 Report on IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflict, supra note 25, at 725; Pejic, supra note 95, at 346; LUBELL, supra note 29, at 117, 
118; SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 30, at 233. 
136. DANIEL L. BYMAN, BREAKING THE BONDS BETWEEN AL-QAIDA AND ITS AF-
FILIATE ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media 
/research/files/papers/2012/7/alqaida%20terrorism%20byman/alqaida%20terrorism%2
0byman.pdf. 
137. AP II, supra note 6, art. 1. 
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must be distinguished from linking the actions of an armed group to those 
of another armed group or a party to the conflict. Therefore, the concept 
does not correspond directly to the issue under discussion.138  
 The “overall control” test used to internationalize a non-international 
armed conflict could also provide a template. As articulated in the ICTY’s 
Tadić appeals judgment, the State party to a conflict need not direct specific 
actions, but must have overall control of the armed group in question.139 
This test requires a high standard of control over an armed group as it is 
developed for the purpose of triggering the full body of IAC law. The pur-
pose of the test would be different in the NIAC context—to link an armed 
group to a party to a NIAC with consequences for targeting. It is, there-
fore, not self-evident that the same test would be appropriate. Moreover, if 
transferred to NIACs, this test would necessitate that one armed group 
party to the conflict have overall control of another armed group. Today 
this often is not the case.   
 In sum, these analogies are not particularly helpful in addressing the 
challenge presented by multiple organized armed groups connected to 
varying degrees to one another and to a party to the conflict. Given the 
lack of clarity in the law concerning identifiable parties, the question re-
mains whether the armed groups can still be part of the same conflict, such 
that their hostilities are accumulated in order to establish the requisite level 
of intensity for an armed conflict to exist.   
One option is to apply the intensity test more strictly in situations of 
global armed conflicts, assessing the requirement solely based on the vio-
lence that occurs between the specific parties to that conflict. Any violence 
with affiliated armed groups would be considered separately. As a conse-
quence, some situations might not fulfill the intensity requirement and, 
therefore, not qualify as an armed conflict (either because the situation as a 
                                                                                                                      
138. Interestingly, one of the key authors of the ICRC Guidance, Nils Melzer, equates 
this “belonging to” link to that of a belligerent nexus. Melzer states that for an armed 
group even to be part of an IAC the violence conducted by that armed group must be 
“designed to support one of the belligerents against another (belligerent nexus).” Nils 
Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques 
of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 831, 841 (2010). He 
continues, “[w]hether or not a group is involved in hostilities does not only depend on 
whether it resorts to organized armed violence temporally and geographically coinciding 
with a situation of armed conflict, but also on whether such violence is designed to sup-
port one of the belligerents against another (belligerent nexus).” Id. 
139. Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra note 129, ¶ 122.    
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whole does not fulfill the intensity requirement or because a particular cir-
cumstance is not considered to be part of an existing armed conflict).140 A 
law enforcement regime then would apply, affecting the applicable rules on 
targeting and detention.   
However, this approach does not deal with the realities of some con-
flicts today where armed groups may be linked with one another to differ-
ing degrees and over geographic distances. As a consequence, States may 
reject this option on the ground that it does not provide adequate means to 
address what they view as a threat. Furthermore, in situations where sepa-
rate ongoing internal conflicts take place—such as in Somalia—the normal 
law enforcement regime may not be wholly functional. This absence, along 
with the outside State’s inability to legally resort to the law of armed con-
flict, could result in a legal gap. Considering that one of the initial underly-
ing reasons for developing NIAC law was prevention of a legal black hole, 
such an outcome is not optimal. 
An alternative suggestion is to develop an additional requirement—that 
the affiliated armed group constitute a threat to the State party. The term 
“threat” here refers to an actual threat based on the intentions and actions 
of the armed group. In a sense, this extra condition suggests that the pur-
pose of the group would matter.141 The purpose here does not refer to a 
political purpose, but that the armed group’s main purpose, as evidenced 
by its actions, is fighting the State in question. An assessment of who the 
group targets and what their goals are would indicate whether the armed 
group was a threat and thus actually part of the global conflict. As a conse-
quence, violence stemming from armed conflicts that are separate from the 
threat posed to the State could not be factored into the same intensity as-
sessment.  
So, for example, a number of different armed groups participate in the 
hostilities in Yemen. Fighting is taking place in the north between the Al-
Houthi tribe and the Yemeni government; in the south with Southern Mo-
bility Movement attempting to secede;142 and throughout the country be-
                                                                                                                      
140. A State could still be involved in an armed conflict if invited by the territorial 
State. For example, the United States could legitimately be part of the armed conflict 
against AQAP in Yemen, after being asked to fight on behalf of the Yemeni government. 
However, this would not constitute a “global” armed conflict.  
141. Currently, the majority view is that the purpose of an armed group does not mat-
ter when determining if an armed conflict exists. See, e.g., 31st ICRC Conference on IHL 
CHALLENGES, supra note 15, at 11; Vité, supra note 77, at 78. 
142. Armed Conflict Database: Yemen (Houthis/AQAP/SMM), INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts/yemen--houthis-aqap-
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tween AQAP and the Yemeni government.143 Even if AQAP is considered 
to be part of Al Qaeda, the violence taking place in Yemen relating to the 
internal conflict could not be factored into the intensity assessment in the 
U.S. conflict against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Put differently, because the 
hostilities of these other armed groups are not directed against the United 
States, they are not part of the same conflict.  
This suggestion addresses the lack of clarity in what constitutes the 
identifiable party to the conflict when conflicts become more geographical-
ly dispersed and multiple organized armed groups are involved. It also 
serves to place a constraint on when and where an armed conflict may ex-
ist. At the same time, it has the benefit of maintaining consistency with in-
ternal conflicts.   
There are clear risks, however, in considering that the purpose of an 
armed group might matter. Most notably, the subjective nature of deter-
mining a purpose, particularly in an environment where the same group 
may have multiple agendas, poses practical challenges. Moreover, just as it 
may be difficult to separate out the hostilities conducted by multiple armed 
groups for the purpose of establishing the intensity requirement in internal 
conflicts, the same issue easily arises with hostilities that span multiple terri-
tories. Finally, this suggestion of looking to the threat posed by the armed 
group does not reflect current law.  
The point here is that the issue of links between organized armed 
groups and the calculation of the intensity requirement is an area where the 
law needs more clarity, particularly in a global context.   
C. Intensity Criterion and Conglomeration of Violence over Space 
 
Even if the various affiliated groups are considered to be involved in a sin-
gle conflict, a second issue arises as to how the intensity requirement 
should be assessed in global conflict. Does the distribution of violence over 
multiple territories make the hostilities less intense? Put differently, if the 
overall level of violence was deemed sufficiently intense to satisfy the Tadić 
                                                                                                                      
smm-9651 (last visited Aug. 2, 2013); BYMAN, supra note 136, at 11 (“Even AQAP, often 
touted as the affiliate closest to al-Qa’ida because it has attempted attacks on American 
civil aviation—perhaps the ultimate target for the al-Qa’ida core—still concentrates pri-
marily on targets within Yemen itself.” ). 
143. Rule of Law Armed Conflicts Project: Yemen, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS , http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/current_conflict.php?id_state=234 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
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test, should it matter whether that violence occurred entirely within a single 
State or was instead spread over multiple States, such that in each State it is 
sporadic?   
Given the lack of clarity on the matter, it is useful to resort to the un-
derlying purpose of the intensity requirement. The criterion is intended to 
differentiate a situation of armed conflict from one of internal disturb-
ances, or as articulated by ICTY case law, “to distinguish an armed conflict 
from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activi-
ties, all of which are not subject to international law.”144 The law does not 
define internal disturbances. ICRC internal guidance, however, on the 
meaning of the phrase states that internal disturbances can range from “the 
spontaneous generation of acts of revolt to the struggle between more or 
less organized groups and the authorities in power. In these situations, 
which do not necessarily degenerate into open struggle, the authorities in 
power call upon extensive police forces, or even armed forces, to restore 
internal order.”145 As discussed earlier, the intensity requirement includes 
both components of gravity and duration.146 The question here revolves 
around whether the geographic diffusion of violence renders it less grave. 
An underlying purpose of the intensity requirement was to differentiate 
between situations where the normal domestic law regime of the country in 
conflict would be sufficient to deal with the unrest and those where a 
break-down in the system occurred.147 In the case of a global armed con-
flict where the violence is spread out geographically, if the necessary level 
of intensity (in terms of gravity) is not present in each territory then argua-
bly there may not be a basis upon which to resort to a LOAC regime. In 
such a case, presumably normal domestic law and human rights regimes 
                                                                                                                      
144. Milosević Decision, supra note 52, ¶ 26. See also Tadić Trial Judgment, supra note 51, 
¶ 562; Delalić Trial Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 184; Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 
84; Corrected Letter of January 28, 1998 from Christopher Hulse, Ambassador of the 
United Kingdom, to the Swiss Government (July 2, 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org 
/ihl/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument (setting forth 
the UK government’s reservation to Article 1(4) of AP I). Note: the designation of a 
group or acts by a group as “terrorist” has no bearing on whether LOAC applies. Either 
the acts/situation amounts to one of armed conflict or it does not. See, e.g., Djordjević Trial 
Judgment, supra note 57, ¶ 1524, citing the Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶ 5763. 
145. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 34, ¶ 4475. See also 
id., ¶¶ 4474−77.   
146. See supra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text. 
147. See, e.g., Tadić Trial Judgment, supra note 51, ¶ 562; Geiss, supra note 39, at 138. 
Domestic law continues to apply in situations of armed conflict. 
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would be sufficient to deal with the matter.148 A counterargument to this 
perspective is that, from the point of view of the parties to the conflict, the 
consequences are the same whether the violence emanates from one terri-
tory or several. However, the intensity requirement has not been deter-
mined in the past by the effects on the opposing party alone. The calcula-
tion of the intensity requirement has generally included an assessment of 
the situation as a whole. Factors such as civilians fleeing the conflict zone, 
occupation of territory, existence of front lines and quantity of troops de-
ployed have been considered.149 These elements indicate that the violence is 
linked, at least to a geographic region, if not with a State. Therefore, when 
hostilities are so dispersed that the domestic legal regime is able to func-
tion, it could be difficult to maintain that an armed conflict exists. 
D. Intensity Criterion and State Sovereignty 
 
State sovereignty was another impetus for creating the requirement that the 
hostilities reach a certain level of intensity before LOAC could apply. States 
wanted to limit the involvement of outside States in their domestic affairs. 
This objective must, therefore, be seen in light of the fact that the types of 
conflicts envisioned were mainly internal armed conflicts. In an extraterri-
torial NIAC context, the reluctance of the State party to the conflict to be 
subject to interference from other States in its internal affairs largely disap-
pears.150 Neither internal disturbances nor the conflict itself takes place in 
their own territory.  
Does it matter in terms of what LOAC requires for its application that 
it is the State not party to the conflict whose territorial integrity is infringed? 
In other words, could this geographic shift in where the hostilities occur 
affect one of the original underlying reasons for the existence of the 
threshold? In contrast to the previous two points (whether the violence 
undertaken by various armed groups may be conglomerated and whether 
the distribution of violence over space means that it does not reach the suf-
ficient level of intensity), this point questions whether the level of intensity 
                                                                                                                      
148. The separate issue then would arise of how one State may exercise law enforce-
ment authority in a second State without violating its sovereignty.  
149. Boškoski Trial Judgment, supra note 52, ¶ 177. See, e.g., Louise Arimatsu, The Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo 1993–2012, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION 
OF CONFLICTS, supra note 25, at 146, 153. 
150. See Sassòli, supra note 30.  
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customarily required for internal armed conflicts is the same for extraterri-
torial conflicts. 
It may be argued that the territorial State (i.e., the State in which an ex-
traterritorial NIAC physically takes place) has an interest in trying to pre-
vent incursions into its sovereignty, even though it may not be a party to 
that NIAC. An incursion by an outside State in order to fight an armed 
group would likely have implications for the “uninvolved” territorial State. 
For instance, such an action could be an indication that the territorial State 
is not able to maintain its own security—an image that States usually take 
pains to avoid. Or, the territorial State may be concerned that the outside 
State might gain control or influence within their State. 
The implications this shift might have on establishing the threshold of 
an extraterritorial armed conflict are not clear. At the very least, the reas-
signment of which State’s sovereignty is affected indicates that issues aris-
ing from the shifted location of the conflict warrant further examination. 
Therefore, even if one accepts the premise that NIACs may exist extraterri-
torially, the fact that the law was designed for a different context presents 
challenges in determining the existence of an armed conflict.   
 
VI. GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES OF EXISTING ARMED CONFLICTS 
 
The removal of territorial boundaries from a system based on these physi-
cal limits raises the related question of where LOAC may be applied once 
the law of armed conflict has been triggered. Limited discussion has arisen 
previously on this issue in the context of purely internal conflicts. Howev-
er, the main controversy surfaces today specifically with regard to individu-
als affiliated with an organized armed group located in a second State 
(“outside of an active battlefield”151). The unease of some commentators 
that the world could become a battlefield reappears here.  
Because NIAC law was designed for internal application, its extraterri-
torial parameters are not clear. Two main options have been discussed for 
how to deal with this challenge. One proposes that the geographic applica-
tion of LOAC is limited to the area of hostilities. The other maintains that 
                                                                                                                      
151. John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterter-
rorism Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and 
Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012 
/p28100 [hereinafter Brennan Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center]. See also DOJ White 
Paper, supra note 1. 
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once an armed conflict exists the law may extend beyond the immediate 
zone of hostilities. This latter approach has been interpreted by some to 
suggest that the law applies to the parties to the conflict wherever they may 
be located.   
The first proposal, suggesting that LOAC would not apply at a distance 
from wherever the hostilities were taking place,152 may seem logical on its 
face, but lacks a legal basis. Jurisprudence from the ICTY dealing with the 
geographic scope of Common Article 3 within a State contradicts this inter-
pretation, providing that “international humanitarian law continues to ap-
ply . . . in the case of internal conflicts . . . [to] the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”153 The 
ICTY case law has generally been interpreted by other bodies to mean that 
Common Article 3 applies to the entire country in which a conflict is taking 
place, regardless of where hostilities occur.154 This language has been re-
peatedly upheld by subsequent ICTY and ICTR judgments.155 In the ab-
sence of explicit treaty law or customary international law, this jurispru-
dence could be said to have relevance when it comes to interpreting the 
geographic contours of internal conflicts.   
Resort to the object and purpose of the law also supports application 
of the law beyond areas of hostilities. One of the law’s fundamental pur-
poses is to ensure protection of individuals once in the hands of the ene-
my. To interpret the law as only applying to areas of combat would reduce 
                                                                                                                      
152. Jennifer Daskal, for example, discusses the “hot” battlefield. Jennifer C. Daskal 
The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict 
Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1165, 1192–1209 (2013). 
153. Tadić Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 5, ¶ 70. 
154. See, e.g., Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 34, ¶¶ 635−36; Prosecutor v. Kay-
ishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶176 (May 29, 1999); GS (Existence of 
internal armed conflict) Afghanistan [2009] UKAIT 00010 (U.K. Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal); Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the 
Independent Expert, Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/119 (Jan. 14, 2002) (by Ghanim Alnajjar). See also Kress, supra note 14, at 
265.   
155. See, e.g., Blaskić Trial Judgment, supra note 39, ¶ 64; Delalić Trial Judgment, supra 
note 51, ¶¶ 185, 194, 209; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 
43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 25, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 
Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 568 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); Kunarac Appeals Judgment, supra note, 52, ¶ 57; Limaj Trial 
Judgment, supra note 32, ¶ 84, Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 
27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001).   
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the protection afforded to some of the most vulnerable, who may be locat-
ed at a distance from active hostilities.  
Finally, the text of AP II can be turned to for some guidance, even 
though the types of conflicts under discussion here are those with a lower 
threshold. AP II explicitly provides that it applies to “to all persons affect-
ed by an armed conflict.”156 This indicates that although AP II limits its 
applicability to the State in which the conflict is taking place,157 its applica-
tion is not restricted to areas of active hostilities.158  
 The second approach considers that once an armed conflict exists 
LOAC applies beyond the area of active hostilities.159 It is argued that this 
is the more defensible position of the two. Although this view does not 
find an explicit basis in treaty law, it is difficult to find justification within 
the existing law for restricting the application of LOAC to a certain region 
once an armed conflict exists. In addition, the ICTY and ICTR case law 
just noted could be said to indirectly support this position in that it inter-
prets the application of the law as extending beyond the combat zones. 
However, too much reliance on this jurisprudence is misguided as it still 
depends on State boundaries. For example, if one accepts that the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan, does Common Arti-
cle 3 then apply throughout the country of Pakistan?  
The view that LOAC applies beyond the area of active hostilities leads 
to the question of whether anything restricts the geographic application of 
LOAC.  One approach is to interpret the ICTY case law as literally refer-
ring to the areas where the parties to the conflict have control.160 Under 
                                                                                                                      
156. Art. 2 AP II. See also arts. 5, 6 AP II and Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A 
Global Battlefield: Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65, 75-76 (2013). 
157. While there has been discussion that Common Article 3 applies extraterritorially, 
there has been very little debate regarding AP II’s extraterritorial reach. 
158. The ICRC Commentary to AP II supports this interpretation. AP II COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 34, ¶ 4490 (“[p]ersons affected by the conflict within the meaning of this 
paragraph are covered by the Protocol wherever they are in the territory of the State engaged in 
conflict” and that the “applicability of protocol follows from a criteria related to persons, 
and not to places”) (emphasis added).  
159. See, e.g., Lubell & Derejko, supra note 156, at 82.  (“. . . the applicability of the ius 
in bello does not depend on the number of miles between the individual and the fighters 
they are commanding and directing, nor does it stand or fall on whether the individual is 
sitting on one side of  a border or another. The tests are the standard and long-recognized 
requirements for determining who or what is a legitimate target under IHL . . . .”)  
160. Kress proposes a version of this interpretation by suggesting that the law extends 
only to areas where “the non-State party has established an actual (quasi-) military infra-
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such a view, NIAC law would only apply to the territory under control of 
the Pakistani Taliban (and other armed groups) in the North-West Frontier 
Province. This construction, however, presents hurdles.161 First, what is 
meant by control?162 Second, if it is territorial control that is envisioned, the 
majority of commentators and jurisprudence view the control of territory 
by an armed group as an indicator for the applicability of Common Article 
3, rather than an obligation.163 It would not make sense to require territorial 
control by an armed group in order to determine the reach of an armed 
conflict within a country, but not to require territorial control for the exist-
ence of an armed conflict.164 Third, taken to its extreme this interpretation 
illogically suggests that if neither party controls territory, then LOAC does 
not apply,165 leading to the possibility that LOAC would not apply precisely 
where the battle rages.  
The U.S. government position that LOAC is not geographically con-
strained with regard to individual members of a party to a conflict166 has 
engendered criticism.167 However, it is a defensible stance if one has already 
accepted that the territorial boundaries of States do not limit LOAC’s ap-
plication. The bigger issue seems to be that the law was not designed for 
extraterritorial application. As such, should the view that territorial bounda-
ries are not relevant to LOAC’s application gain force, it may be that the 
law will develop in a clearer and more nuanced manner.168   
                                                                                                                      
structure on the territory of the third State's soil that would enable the non-State party to 
carry out intensive armed violence also from there”. Kress, supra note 14, at 266. 
161. See, e.g., Arimatsu, supra note 2, at 187, 188. 
162. Arimatsu points this out in id. at 188. 
163. See, e.g., PROVOST, supra note 46, at 267; MOIR, supra note 41, at 38, 43; Pejic, su-
pra note 82, at 85−86; BOTHE, supra note 62, at 623; Tahzib-Lie & Swaak-Goldman, supra 
note 117, at 246; Vité, supra note 77, at 79. 
164. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 156, at 69. 
165. Id. However, Kress’s suggestion that there must be actual military infrastructure 
with the ability to carry out intensive violence avoids the issue of control. Kress, supra note 
14, at 266. 
166. See, e.g., Brennan Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center, supra note 151 (“There 
is nothing in international law that . . . prohibits us from using lethal force against our 
enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is 
unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.”) 
167. Kress, supra note 14, at 266. 
168. Interestingly, while of the view that the law follows the parties to the conflict, the 
U.S. government places additional policy restraints onto the application of LOAC. The 
DOJ White Paper states that when targeting an individual located in another country in 
the context of an extraterritorial NIAC, the individual must be high ranking in the organi-
zation, the armed group should have a “significant and organized presence” in that coun-
 
 
 
Global Armed Conflict? Vol. 89 
 
741 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity with regard to this issue, significant 
restrictions on the use of force against an individual located at a distance 
from hostilities in a second country already exist. Perhaps most important-
ly, the question only arises in the first place if an armed conflict exists be-
tween the State using force and the armed group against which the force is 
directed (which includes establishing that the group to which the individual 
belongs is an identifiable party). Second, and crucially, the separate ques-
tion then arises of whether an individual is targetable (either by virtue of 
the membership approach or because s/he is directly participating in hostil-
ities).169  This includes determining that the individual in question has a suf-
ficient nexus to the ongoing armed conflict.170 
Should those conditions be fulfilled, then the constraints within LOAC 
still apply (such as all of the rules pertaining to the principles of distinction 
and proportionality), as would the country’s domestic law and human 
rights law to the degree that it interacts with LOAC. It is likely that if the 
occurrence were far from active hostilities the latter two bodies of law 
would play a greater role. Issues of State sovereignty could, and often do, 
present one of the greatest limitations on action. Therefore, it is not the 
case that force may be used anywhere in the world at any time against par-
ties to the conflict once an armed conflict exists.          
                                                                                                                              
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the general trend today is that some extraterritorial conflicts 
may qualify as NIACs, despite the fact that they are not geographically con-
fined to a single State. This interpretation recognizes that to artificially re-
                                                                                                                      
try and the location should be one from which “senior operational leaders, plan attacks 
against U.S. persons and interests.” DOJ White Paper, supra note 1, at 3, 5 (“The United 
States retains its authority to use force against al-Qa’eda and associated forces outside the 
area of active hostilities when it targets a senior operational leader of the enemy forces 
who is actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.” “If an operation . . . 
were to occur in a location where al-Qa’ida or an associated force has a significant and 
organized presence and from which al-Qa’ida or an associated force, including its senior 
operational leaders, plan attacks against U.S. persons and interests, the operation would be 
part of the non-international armed conflict between the United States and al-Qa’ida that 
the Supreme Court recognized in Hamdan.”). Although the leaked memorandum is in spe-
cific reference to American citizens, this statement seems to refer more generally to the 
scope of non-international armed conflict.  
169. See supra note 103 for reference to the debate on membership.   
170. Lubell & Derejko, supra note 156, at 75. 
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strict the law in a way that does not reflect either the realities on the ground 
or the purpose of the law itself is counterproductive. However, because the 
existing law was not designed for extraterritorial conflicts, challenges arise 
in its application. 
The issue of links between armed groups in NIACs is an area where 
the law may need reinterpretation or development. Analogies with other 
areas of the law do not lead to more clarity. The tenuous suggestion that in 
order to fulfill the intensity requirement not only should the affiliated 
armed group be organized and part of an identifiable party, but also that 
the group’s actions and goals should constitute a threat to the opposing 
party carries with it practical problems. Specifically, it could be difficult to 
ascertain both the threat and which members of an armed group are actual-
ly participating in actions that are part of the global conflict, as opposed to 
part of a separate internal conflict. 
Determining whether amassing violence that is diffused over distances 
may fulfill the intensity requirement is another example of how the geo-
graphic extension of the law’s application may present difficulties. It has 
been argued here that taking into account the underlying purpose of the 
law, the violence must reach a certain level of intensity within a geographic 
region for an armed conflict to exist. When the violence is spread out geo-
graphically, such that in an individual country the law enforcement regimes 
may function, it is difficult to view the intensity requirement as being met. 
However, as with links, this issue is far from resolved.   
The third principal challenge resulting from the extraterritorial applica-
tion of NIAC law is that a reassignment of sovereignty occurs. It is unclear 
if this shift might impact on how States perceive the threshold of the exist-
ence of an armed conflict.  
Once the existence of an armed conflict has been established, a sepa-
rate issue arises as to the geographic boundaries of that conflict. This im-
pacts the controversial question of when an individual may be targeted or 
detained if located in another country away from the main battlefield. Here 
too, because the law was originally intended to apply within State bounda-
ries, very little guidance exists. It is argued that as the law currently stands, 
once an armed conflict exists LOAC applies to the parties to the conflict 
wherever they may be located, but that other restraints within LOAC and 
jus ad bellum limit its application. In particular, the question of whether an 
armed conflict exists in the first place is not self-evident. The debate on 
who can be targeted and when applies both to internal NIACs and extra-
territorial NIACs. It may be that additional stipulations will be considered 
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necessary as the law develops given the lack of State boundaries and the 
distance from an active battlefield. However, currently the law does not 
require this. Finally, the restrictions found in jus ad bellum curtail action that 
may be taken. 
Therefore, to erase territorial boundaries from the equation entirely 
when establishing the existence of an armed conflict raises challenges to 
the structure of the law and some of its underlying purposes. Certain ob-
stacles may prompt clarification in the law; others may remain as limita-
tions on the law’s application. As a consequence, it is not clear where the 
bar for the application of Common Article 3, and thus LOAC, lies, particu-
larly when applied to conflicts that spread across multiple countries.  Some 
States want to ensure that they have sufficient flexibility to deal with these 
circumstances. Other States (as well as organizations and commentators) 
are concerned that the law may be interpreted too permissively and ulti-
mately be abused. A balance must be found in the solution to these issues.  
 
 
 
